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IN RE ROMERO:1 STERILIZATION AND COMPETENCY
I. INTRODUCTION
What circumstances justify forcing a mentally disabled adult to be
sterilized? The once acceptable practice of sterilizing retarded individu-
als is no longer presumptively acceptable. Mentally impaired people are
entitled to the same protection of fundamental procreation rights as
other individuals. Courts have required satisfaction of a high burden of
proof before ordering sterilization. A multitude of tests have been de-
veloped to ensure protection of these protective rights.
The Colorado Supreme Court recently confronted forced steriliza-
tion of a mentally disabled adult in In re Romero, overturning the lower
court order granting sterilization, and effectively preserving Romero's
liberty interest. The means used by the court, however, were untradi-
tional and incomplete as a guideline for future cases. The court's deci-
sion focused upon the competency of Romero in making her own
decision regarding sterilization. First, the court defined a test for deter-
mining competency. Applying this test, the court found Romero compe-
tent to make her own decision; however, the court did not strictly follow
their own definition when they applied the competency test.
Traditionally, appellate courts regard a competency test as the pre-
liminary question before ordering sterilization. Appellate courts usually
establish the test and remand to the trial court to determine facts ac-
cording to the test. In contrast, the Colorado Supreme Court deter-
mined the competency test and applied the test without remanding, in
essence serving as fact finder. Though the court found Romero compe-
tent, their opinion provided no guidance for the appropriate steriliza-
tion test in cases of mental incompetency.
This Comment provides the evolution of attitudes toward steriliza-
tion resulting in the Colorado Supreme Court's position today. An
overview of different tests courts have used in determining sterilization
provides a comparison to aid in understanding the Colorado Supreme
Court's approach. This Comment focuses on the development and ap-
plication of the competency test as part of a sterilization decision, as well
as the implications of Romero to future forced sterilization cases.
II. BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING STERILIZATION
Sterilization of retarded or mentally defective individuals was widely
accepted in the early twentieth century under the theory of eugenics.
2
1. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990).
2. See In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1981). The Colorado Supreme Court
defines eugenics as "the science of improving the qualities of the human race by the care-
ful selection of parents." Id. at 368 n.2. "'Positive eugenics would accomplish this by
encouraging reproduction of those with favorable traits; negative eugenics, such as sterili-
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Justice Holmes captured the general attitude toward eugenic steriliza-
tion of institutional patients when he proclaimed "three generations of
imbeciles are enough" in Buck v. Bell.3 Buck stands as the high water
mark for eugenic sterilization as an appropriate expression of govern-
mental authority.4 After Buck, thirty states enacted statutes authorizing
compulsory eugenic sterilization. 5
Near the middle of the century, eugenics faced constitutional chal-
lenges because of the development of scientific evidence which discred-
ited many premises of eugenic sterilization.
6
Skinner v. Oklahoma established procreation as a fundamental consti-
tutional right,7 marking the demise of court-enforced eugenic steriliza-
tions. In Skinner, the Supreme Court overturned a statute providing for
sterilization of thrice convicted felons for crimes involving moral turpi-
tude because it invidiously discriminated against certain types of individ-
uals in the exercise of a fundamental right.8 Although Skinner did not
explicitly overrule Buck v. Bell, courts and commentators have often
stated that Buck would not hold up under the strict tests applied to steril-
zation, would discourage or prohibit the reproduction of those with unfavorable traits.'"
(Id. quoting Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENVER LJ. 631 (1969)).
3. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Buck upheld a statute authorizing sterilization of insti-
tutionalized mental patients. The Court decided that Carrie Buck, mentally impaired and
the daughter of a mentally deficient woman, was the probable "potential parent of socially
inadequate offspring," and that preventing a third generation of imbeciles sufficiently out-
weighed due process and equal protection claims against the statute. Id. But see O'Hara &
Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEo. LJ. 20, 31 (1956). A sociologist who reviewed the
evidence used by the Court in Buck found both Carrie Buck and her mother to be morons,
not imbeciles. Carrie's daughter was reportedly very bright.
4. Eugenic Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, supra note 2, at 633.
5. Romero, 790 P.2d at 821 (citing Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded- Constitu-
tional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REV. 943, 945 (1982)). Sterilization may
either be voluntary or compulsory. Sterilization is compulsory when the state imposes
sterilization despite the objections of the individual or of one who represents her interests.
In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467, 473 (1981). Romero involves a non-consensual or
compulsory sterilization. The court in Romero also notes that Colorado has never enacted
a compulsory sterilization statute. Romero, 790 P.2d at 821 n.7 (citing In re A.W., 637 P.2d
at 368 n.3).
6. See Stefan, Whose Egg Is It Anyway?: Reproductive Rights of Incarcerated, Institutionalized
and Incompetent Women, 13 NovA L.REv. 405, 415 (1989). The campaign to sterilize the
mentally retarded slowed down partly because the eugenics movement, responsible for
much of the sterilization activity, became discredited by association with Hider. Hitler
modeled his programs upon a law developed by an American eugenicist. Id. Three factors
have stimulated the reform of sterilization law: (I) the discrediting of the eugenic theory;
(2) the development of the constitutional doctrine of reproductive privacy; and (3) the
changing conception of mental retardation. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons:
Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, DurE LJ. 806, 809 (1986).
7. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Skinner court stated:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and sur-
vival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reach-
ing and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no
redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the






ization statutes today.9 The 1960's and 1970's marked a wave of chal-
lenges to eugenic sterilization statutes, resulting in the repeal of many. 10
In contrast to the compulsory, eugenics-based statutes, consensual
sterilization statutes permit sterilization under certain circumstances.
Colorado, and many other states, currently have consensual sterilization
statutes. 11 In addition to sterilizing by statutory authority, courts rely
on their parens patriae 2 authority to consider sterilization orders.
1
3
Sterilization laws must withstand constitutional challenge as an in-
trusion on an individual's fundamental right to procreate and to prevent
procreation.1 4 The decision whether to beget or bear a child is at the
very heart of constitutionally protected choices.1 5 Courts apply strict
scrutiny to statutes that interfere with fundamental rights. 16 A statute
will survive strict scrutiny only if the state can show a compelling interest
in enforcement of the statute and nonexistence of any less intrusive
means to accomplish the same goal.'
7
9. See In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 368; In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 472; Eugenic Sterilization
Statutes: A Constitutional Re-Evaluation, 14J. F m. L. 280, 297 (1975); Ferster, Eliminating the
Unfit - Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. LJ. 591, 602-04 (1966); Eugenic Sterilization -A
Scientific Analysis, supra note 2, at 633.
10. Stefan, supra note 6, at 417. Colorado enacted a statute limiting consensual sterili-
zation and prohibiting forced sterilization. COLO. REv. STAT. sec. 27-10.5-128 (1989).
Sterilization - limitations:
1) Any person with developmental disabilities who is over eighteen years of
age who has given consent may be sterilized, subject to the following...
(2) No person with developmental disabilities who has not given consent shall be steril-
ized. (emphasis added).
The Colorado Supreme Court circumvented this law. See In re A.W., 637 P.2d at 373 (en
banc)(Lohr,J., specially concurring). The court decided that the statutes regulating sterili-
zation applied to adults and the statutory exclusion of minors did not prohibit the court
from acting to sterilize a minor.
11. See COLO. REv. STAT. sec. 27-10.5-128 (1989).
12. Parens patriae power comes from the inherent equitable authority of the sovereign
to protect persons within the state who cannot protect themselves because of a legal disa-
bility. In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 561, 450 A.2d 1376, 1381 (1982). For a gen-
eral discussion, see 88 CJ.S. Parens Patriae at 159 (1978).
13. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 821; In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 374; In re Grady, 426 A.2d
at 479-80; In re Sallmaier, 85 Misc. 2d 295, 297, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1976); In
re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635, 637-39 (1980). But Cf Wade v. Bethesda Hosp.,
337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (judge not immune for granting sterilization order
where this was outside his jurisdiction).
14. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (fundamental right to procre-
ate). The right to prevent procreation was first confronted in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the "penumbral" right of privacy in marriage was created,
barring state intervention in decisions of contraception. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), extended Griswold's logic to unmarried persons. See also Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)(right to privacy of procreation extends to minors as well as
adults); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(woman's qualified right to terminate
pregnancy).
15. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
16. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
17. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. When fundamental rights or personal liberties are
involved, constitutional standards require an overriding, compelling state interest and
strict scrutiny of the legislation serving that interest. The legislation must be both neces-
sary and the least intrusive measure in method or implementation. The Supreme Court
has established procreative rights as fundamentally encompassed by a recognized zone of
privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Note, Sterilization of the Developmentally
Disabled: Shedding Some Myth Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 599, 611-12 (1981).
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Courts apply various tests to weigh the competing interests in steril-
ization cases. Their analysis generally includes a two-step process to de-
termine whether sterilization is appropriate. First, the individual must
be proven incompetent to make her own sterilization decision before the
court will make this decision for her.18 Determining competency is a
crucial step in the analysis. If the person is capable of making her own
decision, the state's interests must yield to her autonomy. To prove
someone incompetent to make a sterilization decision, courts require
dear and convincing evidence of incompetency.' 9
Once incompetency is determined, courts then decide whether to
grant the sterilization petition by examining the interests of the incom-
petent. Courts have generally applied three tests to determine whether
to grant a sterilization petition: (1) substituted judgment,20 (2) best in-
terest,2 1 and (3) medically essential. 22 Courts using the substituted
judgment23 test consider such factors as: (1) physical capability to pro-
create; (2) existence of less intrusive means of birth control (before or-
dering sterilization the court must find all other means unworkable and
inquire if sterilization reversal might soon become available); (3) medi-
cal necessity for the procedure; (4) the nature and extent of the disabil-
ity (considering spousal help and prognosis for treatment of the mental
disability); (5) likelihood of sex resulting in pregnancy; and (6) risks of
sterilization weighed against risks of pregnancy. The court may also
take the ward's desires and religion into consideration before ordering
sterilization.
2 4
The "best interest" test is similar to the substituted judgment test.
The goal of the best interest test is to do what is in the best interest of
18. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981); In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819; In re
A.W., 637 P.2d 366; In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); In re Grady, 85 NJ.
235, 426 A.2d 467.
19. See In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541, 543 (1980); In re Grady, 426 A.2d
at 483; In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 608 P.2d 635, 640. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418 (1979)(clear and convincing standard of proof for institutional commitments). The
court in Romero also adopted this standard. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 822. Many non-
consensual sterilization petitions involve minors whose competency to make sterilization
determinations is not an issue. Minors are considered "protected persons" and require
either parental consent for many things or a guardian if there is no parent. See Colo. Rev.
Stat. 15-14-101(2) and 15-14-204 (1987). But see In re G.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska
1981)(where court used statute determining incapacitated person to presume incompe-
tence to make own sterilization determination).
20. See In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 720-21.
21. In re Debra B., 495 A.2d 781, 782-83 (Me. 1985).
22. In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375-76.
23. "Substituted judgment" means deciding for the person as if she were deciding for
herself.
[W]e have to compare very carefully and very honestly the value of being spared
the consequences of "wrong" decisions with the value of being left free to make
one's own decisions. Do we not all make "wrong" decisions from time to time -
even very costly and harmful ones? And yet, on balance, I don't think very many
of us would be prepared to sacrifice our personal autonomy for the still somewhat
uncertain security of having someone else, presumably brighter than us and pre-
sumably well-intentioned, make all our critical decisions for us.
Endicott, Decision-Making Time on Guardianship, 3 ENTOURAGE 17, (1988).
24. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 723.
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the retarded person. 25 This test adds a good faith requirement and re-
quires a clear and convincing burden of proof.
2 6
The "medically essential" test requires a determination by medical
expert witnesses that sterilization is clearly necessary, to preserve the
life or health of the person to be sterilized.
27
III. INSTANT CASE: IN RE ROMERO
A. Factual Background
In Romero the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
order to sterilize Romero. 28 At the age of thirty-three, LaVista Romero
suffered oxygen deprivation from complications associated with diabe-
tes. Brain damage resulted.29 Romero is the mother of two children,
who were not in her custody.3 0 Ms. Harvey, Romero's mother, had Ro-
mero declared an incapacitated person3 l and had herself appointed
guardian3 2 when Romero was thirty-seven years old.
In 1988, Harvey petitioned the district court to order Romero's
sterilization.3 3 A guardian ad litem was appointed for Romero.3 4 After
25. Id. at 720.
26. In re Grady, 85 NJ. 235, 426 A.2d 467, 486 (1981).
27. In re A. W. 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981).
28. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 820 (Colo. 1990).
29. Id.
30. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 1-2 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 1988).
31. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 820 n.1. An incapacitated person is defined as:
Any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physi-
cal illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication,
or other cause (except minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient understand-
ing or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his
person.
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-101(1) (1987).
32. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 820. See CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 15-14-301 to 314
(1987) (provisions for appointment of guardians for incapacitated persons).
33. The statute mandates the proceedings that must be followed in a sterilization con-
sideration. The statute requires a petition be filed with the court. The petition must set
forth the logistics of the hearing. Furthermore, the person with the disability must be
present at the hearing and if the person is indigent, counsel must be appointed to the
person for whom sterilization is being considered. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-129
(1989).
34. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990), rev'd 790 P.2d
819 (Colo. 1990) (Appellant argued that Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-10.5-129(3), (4) requires
counsel be appointed for the developmentally disabled person whose sterilization is in
dispute. The trial court, however, did not appoint counsel, and instead appointed a guard-
ian ad litem, as in In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981). Appellants argued that a guardian
ad litem paternalistically acts only in the best interest of a person, which may mean ignoring
the person's desires. Counsel, however, acts on behalf of the person's desires, not pater-
nalistically.). See COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-14-314 (1987) (guardian ad litem is appointed to:
(1) A special fiduciary appointed by the court to represent and protect in the
proceedings, the interest of the minor....
(2) A guardian ad litem shall diligently take such steps as he deems necessary
under the circumstances to represent and protect the interests of the person for
whom he was appointed....
(3) The guardian ad litem, may, but need not be, an attorney....
In re Grady stated that a guardian ad litem should represent "zealously the interests of his
ward" in appropriate ways. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467. The Grady standard
indicates that a guardian ad litem acts paternalistically. The court in Romero was not bound
by the requirements of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-314 (1987) because Romero's develop-
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hearing the testimony of Harvey, Romero, three doctors, and a social
worker on the staff of the nursing home where Romero resided, the trial
court ordered Romero sterilized.5 5 The three expert witnesses agreed
that sterilization was medically necessary.3 6 The trial court found that
Romero lacked the mental capacity to consent knowingly to sterilization
and the ability to judge matters requiring forethought.37 The court also
found Romero's competency to make decisions unlikely to improve in
the future.3 8 Though Romero was capable of reproduction, the trial
court found that alternative forms of birth control were not available.3 9
On appeal, Romero challenged the constitutionality of the Colo-
rado statute4 ° regarding sterilization and argued that less intrusive
forms of birth control were available. 4 1 The Colorado Supreme Court,
however, reversed the decision without addressing the statute's consti-
tutionality and without determining the availability of less intrusive al-
ternatives. The court reversed the sterilization order on the threshold
issue of competency. Reviewing the trial court record, the court held
that Romero was not proven incompetent by "clear and convincing" evi-
dence.42 Consequently, the court never reached other issues.
B. Majority Opinion
The Romero majority determined that Colorado had no statute that
applied to Romero's situation. Because she was brain damaged after the
age of twenty-two, Romero did not fit under the definition of "develop-
mentally disabled."'43 The court relied on its parens patriae authority for
mental disability occurred at age 33, and the statute applies to persons whose disability
manifested before age 22. The court, however, should have considered the purpose
served by counsel and appointed counsel though not statutorily required. Doing so would
have best protected the desires, as well as the interests, of Romero.
35. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 2 (At the guardian's request, the trial court
ordered Romero sterilized by tubal ligation). Tubal ligation entails tying the fallopian
tubes. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 820 n.2 (citing The Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal
Dictionary 416 (1987)).
36. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 2.
37. Id. at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id. Birth control alternatives were not practical because Romero was too unrelia-
ble to use them, and they risked being improperly implemented. A vasectomy of her part-
ner was not appropriate, and constant supervision was not a solution because Romero's
right to privacy, more fundamental than her right of procreation, would be violated.
40. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-128, 130 (1989).
41. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 824 n.15.
42. Id. at 824.
43. See CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 27-10.5-128 to 130 (1989), which provide for sterilization
of developmentally disabled persons. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 27-10.5-102(10)(a) (1989).
(10)(a) "Developmental disability" means a disability that is manifested before the person
reaches twenty-two years of age; constitutes a substantial handicap to the affected individ-
ual; and is attributable to mental retardation or related conditions which include cerebral
palsy, epilepsy, autism or other neurological conditions when such conditions result in
impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior similar to that of men-
tally retarded persons.
The Court rejected appellant's argument that the statute controlled this case. Appel-
lants argued that COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10.5-130(2) provides that a person proven in-
competent to consent should not be ordered sterilized. Brief for Appellant at 3, In re
Romero, 790 P.2d 819. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-130(2) (1989). "If the court deter-
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jurisdiction, 44 and noted that Colorado has never enacted a compulsory
sterilization statute.
4 5
In its opinion, the court explained the development of fundamental
procreative rights, recognized the seriousness of sterilization, and set
forth criteria for a decision to sterilize. The threshold question was
whether the person was competent to make a sterilization determination
for herself.4 6 The court required proof by clear and convincing evi-
dence before the individual would be deemed incompetent to make this
decision.4 7 Additionally, competency must be unlikely to improve in the
future.48 The court pointed out that retardation in itself does not neces-
sitate a conclusion of incompetency.4 9 Instead, a person should under-
stand what sterilization is as well as the responsibilities of parenthood. 50
The court set forth a test for competency that must be satisfied
before an individual may consent to sterilization. The individual must
understand (1) the nature of the district court proceeding; (2) the link
between sexual activity and reproduction; and (3) the consequences of
sterilization.5 1 In addition, the court rejected the notion that the lack of
mines that a person is incompetent to give consent to sterilization ... or such consent has
not been given, the court shall order that no sterilization... be performed." COLO. REV.
STAT. § 27-10.5-130 et seq., revised in 1985, changed the language from "mentally re-
tarded" to "developmentally disabled." Appellants argued that the change was uninten-
tional and made for no apparent reason other than to include persons not residing in a
facility.
"What changes were made to the rights and sterilization sections?"
Current statutes pertain only to residents of facilities ... We have expanded the
definition of resident and facility to be all inclusive, and conformed the language
to assure that the rights and sterilization sections are applicable to all persons
served under Title 27, Article 10.5.
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1985 Questions and Answers sec. 12 at 6.
Appellants argued that the statute clearly forbade involuntary sterilization in 1975
and an unintended change should not affect the original legislative intent. Brief for Appel-
lant at 4, In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819. The trial court addressed this issue, stating that the
1975 statute applied in the case In re A. W., but neither the majority nor concurring opin-
ions recognized that the statute defeated the "trial court's jurisdiction to consider steriliza-
tion with respect to persons deemed to be outside the purview of the statutory scheme
itself." In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 5.
44. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 821. See In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 374-75 (involving a
minor wherein the court used its parens patriae authority because no statute applied). The
parenspatriae authority has been used by several courts in sterilization cases. In re Moe, 385
Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712; In re Grady, 85 NJ. 235, 426 A.2d 467; In re Hayes, 93 Wash.
2d 228, 608 P.2d 635 (1980).
45. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 821 n.7 (citing In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 368 n.3).
46. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 822. See also In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d at 721; In re Grady, 426 A.2d at 482; In re Hayes, 608 P.2d at 641.
47. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 822.
48. Id. See also In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
293 Md. 685, , 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); In re Grady,
426 A.2d at 483; In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 565,450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (1982); In
re Hayes, 608 P.2d at 641.
49. Romero, 790 P.2d at 822-23.
50. Id. at 822 n. I1 (referring to Murdock, Sterilization of the Retardd: A Problem or Solu-
tion?, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 917, 933-34 (1974) (Most mentally retarded are competent to ap-
preciate the responsibilities and the implications of parenthood.) See also In re Grady, 85
NJ. at , 426 A.2d at 482-83.
51. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 823; See also In re Moe, 385 Mass 555, ,432 N.E.2d 712,
721-22 n.8; In re Grady, 405 A.2d 851, 865 (N.J. Super. 1979), aff'd, 426 A.2d 467
(NJ.1981). Compare In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981) (holding individual incom-
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a technical understanding of bodily functions and a complete under-
standing of the risks of both pregnancy and sterilization was not deter-
minative of incompetency. 5 2 The Court also refused a paternalistic
approach to sterilization. Instead, it chose to extend to the mentally de-
ficient the same rights enjoyed by competent persons. If a person other-
wise incompetent has the understanding required by the competency
test, the court must accept her sterilization decision, no matter how
unreasonable.53
Commenting on the evidence, the court explained that Romero's
I.Q. indicated mild brain damage at worst. 54 Romero's testimony was
articulate and demonstrated that she understood the nature of the dis-
trict court's proceedings. She understood further the relationship be-
tween pregnancy and sexual conduct and the consequences of
sterilization. 55 Only one expert testified about Romero's competency,
and the expert deemed Romero incompetent to consent to sterilization
because of her inability to look at things "in terms of future conse-
quences." 5 6 This testimony, however, was insufficient to meet the bur-
den of clear and convincing evidence.
The Colorado Supreme Court criticized the district court for focus-
ing on reasonableness rather than competency.5 7 The court also de-
cided that Romero understood the risks of pregnancy.5 8 The court,
however, did not include an understanding of the risk of pregnancy as
part of its competency test because it refused to judge the wisdom of
Romero's decision. 59 Finding that the threshold issue of competency
was not met by clear and convincing evidence, 60 the court did not reach
issues regarding the constitutionality of the Colorado statutes, or the
availability of less-intrusive contraceptive alternatives.
6 1
C. Dissent
The dissent argued that the decision in In re A. W. 62 should control.
In A. W., the court directed the district judge to interview the individual
and to consider her desires. The individual's desires, although relevant,
petent according to statute determining incapacity; whereas Colorado court distinguishes
incapacity from incompetency, without presuming incompetency from incapacity).
52. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 823. See also In re Moe, 385 Mass at - n.8, 432 N.E.2d
at 721-22 n.8.
53. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 823; See also Scott, supra note 6, at 840.
54. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 823. Mild brain damage was described as "educable;
can live independently or in group homes." Id. at 823 n.13 (although the classifications
were based on impairments manifested prior to age eighteen, the Romero court relied on
the classifications) (citing American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders 32-33 rev.3d.ed. (1987)).
55. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 823-24.
56. Id. at 824.
57. Id.
58. She stated she would like to have a child, "when and if her diabetes was cured."
Id.
59. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 824.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 824 n.15.
62. 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981).
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would not be conclusive. 63 The preliminary test is that the person must
be proven incapable of making her own decision, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, and her competency should be unlikely to improve in the
future. She must also be proven capable of reproduction. 6 4 Before or-
dering sterilization, the court must find by dear and convincing evi-
dence that sterilization is medically necessary.
6 5
The dissent disagreed with majority's competency test. Although
the court addressed Romero's understanding of the risks of pregnancy
and childbirth as part of its test, the majority rejected these as part of the
competency test.66 The dissent, on the other hand, strongly argued that
to prove competency the individual must understand the risks of child-
birth and pregnancy.6 7 The dissent then concluded that Romero was
unable to understand the risks of pregnancy.6 8 Romero's view of her
disease and its implications, the dissent concluded, appeared illusory,
and her hopes of an improved condition wishful and unrealistic. 69 The
dissent also emphasized Romero's understanding of the risks in the fu-
ture, as opposed to her understanding in the courtroom, because during
the trial she was being reminded of the implications.
70
The dissent also argued that this presented a case of first impres-
sion and the majority had developed a test which was not available to the
trial court. 7 1 They criticized the majority for not remanding. 72
IV. ANALYSIS
In Romero, the Colorado Supreme Court preserves a competent
adult's right to decide her own procreative destiny. Disagreeing with
the trial court's conclusion, the court explicitly provides the test to de-
termine a person's competency to decide whether to be sterilized. The
court then goes on to apply this test based on the trial court's findings of
fact. This approach differs from the traditional remand that other courts
63. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 825 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id. See also In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981).
66. The majority concluded that Romero understood the risks of pregnancy and
childbirth. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 825 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 826.
68. Q. Do you understand if you got pregnant that it might be risky for your
health?
A. No.
Q. Because you've got diabetes it might male it unsafe for you to be pregnant?
A. It didn't hurt me the first time. I mean the second time is what I should say.
0. Even if there was a risk would you want to get pregnant and have another
baby? A. Not at the nursing home, no.
Q. What about if you are out of the nursing home? What if you were married to
Dean?
A. Yes, I would want a baby then.
Q. Even though it would be risky for you?
A. Yes. I'll take that chance.
Id. at 825-26.
69. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 826 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 826-27 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
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have commonly used.73 Also, the court does not provide a complete
test to be used to determine whether to order sterilization. The court
spoke only to competency and provided no guidance on which test
should be utilized to evaluate the interests of the incompetent.
In many sterilization cases, competency is not an issue because it is
either undisputed or involves a minor. Where incompetency is pre-
sumed, courts focus on which test to apply to determine whether the
incompetent person should be sterilized. Romero differs because it con-
centrates only on the threshold test of competency.
Sterilization affects a fundamental right, whether it is the right to
procreate or the right to prevent procreation.7 4 Incompetents enjoy the
same constitutional protections as all other people, and their rights
should be carefully guarded. The courts, therefore, must take all steps
to prevent abuses of these rights.75 The Colorado Supreme Court does
so by delaying consideration of the sterilization issue until after incom-
petency is proven by clear and convincing evidence. 76 A more lenient
standard would indicate the procreative rights at stake are less than fun-
damental, contradicting Skinner and its progeny7 7 and compromising
these rights more often. The higher burden of proof is necessary to
prevent the court from acting where the person is competent to act for
themselves.
The competency criteria used in Romero differ from those used in In
re A. W., on which the district court relied, because A. W. involved the
sterilization of a minor. These criteria do not include an understanding
of the risks of pregnancy. 78 The dissent strongly argued, however, that
the risk requirement was essential to the competency determination.
Should people be able to decide their own procreative destiny if they are
not even able to understand how pregnancy is likely to affect them?
Whether an understanding of pregnancy risks should be an element
73. See In re A.W., 637 p.2d 336, 376; In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 813 (N.C. App.
1983); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 486; In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1383 (Pa. Super.
1982).
74. In re Romero, 790 P.2d at 821-22.
75. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (court ordered, cc parte and
without notice and hearing, sterilization of somewhat retarded woman, who was told she
was having her appendix removed and who discovered her sterility two years later when
she married and tried to conceive).
76. The trial court relied extensively on In re A. W. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip
op. (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 1988). See Legal Center Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant at 7, In re
Romero, 790 P.2d 819. In re A. W. involved a minor, presumed incompetent to make
decisions. Romero, however, involved an adut with a disability. Since a presumption of
incompetence would be clearly erroneous, Romero is consistent with other decisions.
77. Appellees argued in their brief that the court should not go beyond the standards
adopted in In re A. W. by applying the clear and convincing test of Grady, though A. W.
involved a presumptively incompetent minor. Brief for Appellee at 8, In re Romero, 790
P.2d 819.
78. The court, which had to determine by clear and convincing evidence if the youth
would ever be capable of making an informed decision, did not list any criteria for making
this determination. In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 375 (Colo. 1981). The court in A. W. ac-
knowledged the difficulty of proving the minor's future competence. In contrast, adults
make independent decisions for themselves; thus a test of present competency is crucial to
proceedings which potentially strip adults of their decision-making power.
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of the court's test depends on what role the court wishes to act. If the
court wants to adjudge a person's decision-making wisdom, then the risk
analysis should be included. On, the other hand, if the court prefers ob-
jectivity, understanding of pregnancy risks should be excluded from the
test.
The majority found that Romero's testimony indicated an under-
standing of pregnancy risks. Nevertheless, the court deemed her under-
standing not a necessary factor to their competency test. The risk factor
requires forethought.79 To require demonstration of ability to perceive
things in the future would be a difficult standard to meet, and would
require inquiry into the person's wisdom. The risk understanding and
decision wisdom that follows from it would result in a narrower defini-
tion of competency, thus rendering less protection to fundamental pro-
creative rights. Rejecting a risk understanding, and requiring merely
that the person understand the proceedings, creates a broader definition
of competency and offers greater protection to individual rights. In Ro-
mero, the court opted for the more limited inquiry, rejected a risk under-
standing, and protected fundamental rights by broadly defining
competency in the sterilization context.
The Colorado Supreme Court further preserved procreative liber-
ties by resorting to an activist form of appellate review, departing from
the practices of other courts as well as from its own.8 0 Appellate courts
predominantly defer to trial courts for fact finding.8 1 Trialjudges, pres-
ent at hearings, gain first-hand impressions of the evidence and an op-
portunity to consider the relative credibility of facts.8 2 For example,
where testimony of the parties is contradictory, the trial court is the best
fact finder.8 3 Particularly in cases involving mentally retarded individu-
als, appellate courts usually set the standards to be used and remand to
the trial court to apply these standards.
8 4
Determining competency is difficult. Many courts have recom-
mended or required that the judge personally interview the individual as
a means of getting a sense of the person's demeanor.8 5 The person's
79. In re Romero, No. 89SA248, slip op. at 4-5 (D. Colo. Sept 9, 1988), rev'd, 790 P.2d
819 (Colo. 1990).
80. See generally In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 376; In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d 793, 813
(N.C. App. 1983); in re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 486 (1981); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376,
1383 (Pa. Super. 1982).
81. See In reA. W., 637 P.2d at 376; In re Truesdell, 304 S.E.2d at 813; Inre Grady, 85
NJ. at -, 426 A.2d at 486; In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1383.
82. "The sanctity of trial court findings is derived from the recognition that the trial
judge's presence during the presentation of testimonial evidence provides an unparalleled
opportunity to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded the
evidence which is before the court." Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 313, 592 P.2d 792, 796
(1979). See Baumgartner v. Tweedy, 143 Colo. 556, 354 P.2d 586 (1960).
83. Page v. Clark, 592 P.2d at 796. Contradictory testimony made it impossible to
determine from the record whose testimony should be given credit. "In such cases, the
difficult task of finding those facts is best left to the trial court." Id.
84. In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 376 (Colo. 1981); In re Truesdell, 63 N.C. App. 258,
292, 304 S.E.2d 793, 813 (1983); In re Grady, 85 NJ. 235, 272-73, 426 A.2d 467, 486
(1981).
85. See, e.g., In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc.,
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desires are considered but not taken as conclusive. This is important
because her desires are given some weight and she is given a chance to
be heard.8 6 The individual is often put on the witness stand in the trial
court's sterilization proceeding.8 7 An appellate court has access to the
trial court's record, but they have no means of observing the demeanor
of the individual whose liberty is at stake. An appellate court must rely
on the trial court as the fact finder for these impressions.
In Romero, however, the appellate court usurped the trial court's
fact-finding function. The appellate court's actions were unusual be-
cause appellate courts usually only make independent decisions on un-
disputed facts8 8 and the facts in Romero are not undisputed.
When an appellate court becomes a fact-finder as well as a
lawmaker, its burden increases immensely. In addition, the process of
going through the trial court becomes merely an exercise. An appellate
court that attempts to make factual determinations should grant the in-
dividuals involved the same rights as trial courts must. Due process is
violated when a litigant does not have an opportunity to argue a case to
a fact finder.8 9 While appellate courts can make findings of law, to pre-
serve the judicial process and the due process rights of litigants, they
should leave the fact finding to the trial courts because trial courts have
access to the people. To preserve fundamental rights so carefully by
law, but to ignore them in application, makes the law meaningless.
Conversely, an appellate court's determination of factual issues
would be judicially efficient where the facts are not in dispute. But in
Romero, the facts of Romero's competency were disputed, yet the court
concluded from the record that Romero was competent, without the
critical first-hand perspective unique to the trial court. Also, the court
created a test for competency, but did not allow the parties to challenge
its specific requirements.
Had the court defined the competency test and remanded the case
to the trial court to determine competency, Romero would stand as
stronger precedent. The competency test would have been subjected to
rigorous and fair challenge, and would emerge as better guidance for
future cases. By circumventing the trial process, it remains unclear
293 Md. 685, 703, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147 (1983); In re
Grady, 85 N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d at 482; In re Terwilliger, 304 Pa. Super. 553, 565-66, 450
A.2d 1376, 1383 (1982).
86. See In re A. W., 637 P.2d at 375; In re Grady, 85 NJ. at 265, 426 A.2d at 482; In re
Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (1980).
87. The trial court put Ms. Romero on the stand. In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 823
(Colo. 1990).
88. An appellate court should refrain from retrying a case or reweighing conflicting
evidence. The appellate court's concern should be whether reasonable inferences have
been drawn in favor of the verdict on appeal and whether there is substantial competent
evidence to support the verdict and judgment. "Legal sufficiency alone, as opposed to
evidentiary weight, is the appropriate concern of an appellate tribunal." Tibbs v. State,
397 So.2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 (1982).
89. The Colorado Supreme Court previously remanded a sterilization case after speci-
fying which standards the trial court should use. In re A. W., 637 P.2d 366, 376 (Colo.
1981). Yet in Romero, the court did not remand.
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whether the test will survive future appeals. Though the court may have
had concerns over judicial efficiency, efficiency should yield to fairness,
particularly when fundamental rights are at stake.
Romero also provides little guidance on the issue of which steriliza-
tion test should be applied were Romero deemed incompetent. A Colo-
rado case involving a sterilization petition for an incompetent adult will
be a case of first impression because Romero is limited to determining
competency. The court mentions the medically essential test used in In
re A. W. and the best interest test without embracing or delineating cri-
teria for either. The Colorado Supreme Court would probably adopt
the medically essential test used in In re A. W.9 0 Though the medically
essential test was applied to a minor in A. W., this fact would likely not
distinguish A. W.'s test from application to persons incompetent for rea-
sons other than status as a minor. The medically essential test is the
more objective and less paternalistic of the three established steriliza-
tion tests. The substituted judgment and best interests tests would re-
quire consideration of reasonableness, an inquiry specifically criticized
in Romero. Given that the court applied the least-paternalistic test to a
minor in A. W., and that a strong policy against paternalism pervades its
opinion in Romero, the court would likely apply the medically essential
test to an incompetent adult.
Reliance on Romero as precedent is further limited. The court cir-
cumvented addressing two important issues to sterilization: the consti-
tutionality of the Colorado statute and the availability of less-intrusive
alternatives. Both of these issues are central to forced sterilization, yet
Romero offers no guidance. Less intrusive alternatives, as an amicus brief
points out,9 1 are presently available, and more are expected to be tech-
nologically and practically feasible in the near future.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Romero, the Colorado Supreme Court assured the right to deter-
mine procreational destiny for legally-competent adults. Romero estab-
lished a test for competency as the threshold inquiry in forced
sterilization. A person need only understand sex, pregnancy, and the
nature of the sterilization proceedings to be competent. A risk under-
standing is not required. An adult deemed competent under this test
will not be forced to undergo sterilization. An adult deemed incompe-
tent under this test will or may not be subjected to sterilization. The
Romero court did not address the test that would be applied to determine
whether to sterilize an incompetent adult. Though an open question,
the medically essential test for sterilization likely would be applied.
Romero presents a further anomaly in that the court did not remand,
but instead determined Romero competent, thus acting as fact-finder.
90. 637 P.2d at 376.
91. Amicus Curiae A.C.L.U. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819
(Colo. 1990) (No. 89SA248).
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Even more unusual, the facts in the trial record do not necessarily satisfy
a finding of competency under the competency test that Romero itself
established. The Colorado Supreme Court encroached on the trial
court's fact-finding function and risked an imprecise application of its
competency test in future sterilization cases. The fundamental procrea-
tive rights at issue in sterilization deserve the protection afforded by ac-
curate and fair application of tests designed to prevent intrusion on
those rights.
Future sterilization cases in Colorado have a plethora of tests with
which to contend. These tests are designed to cautiously guard funda-
mental rights involving procreation. Future Colorado litigants have a
clearer standard by which they can determine competency in steriliza-
tion cases, but they still face uncertainty in the final sterilization
decision.
Julie Marcus
